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Patterns of minority and majority identification in a multicultural society 
Alita Nandi and Lucinda Platt
*
 
Abstract 
There has been increasing investigation of the national and ethnic identification of minority 
populations in Western societies and how far they raise questions about the success or failure 
of multicultural societies. Much of the political and academic discussion has, however, been 
premised on two assumptions. First that ethnic minority and national identification are 
mutually exclusive, and secondly that national identification represents an overarching 
majority identity, which represents consensus values. In this paper, using a large-scale 
nationally representative UK survey with a varied set of identity questions, and drawing on 
an extension of Berry’s acculturation framework, we empirically test these two assumptions. 
We find that, among minorities, strong British national and minority identities often coincide 
and are not on an opposing axis. We also find that adherence to a British national identity 
shows cleavages within the White majority population.  We further identify variation in these 
patterns by generation and political orientation.  
 
Keywords: identity, UK, British, ethno-religious group, acculturation, second generation  
 
Introduction 
There has been extensive recent debate on the success or otherwise of ‘multiculturalism’. On 
one side has been the claim that the multiculturalist project can incorporate diverse 
populations within a common framework (Kymlicka 1996; Modood 2007; Parekh 2000). On 
the other, there has been an explicit anxiety about the extent to which multicultural responses 
to diversity foster exclusive minority and religious identities and undermine common cause 
(Cameron 2011; Huntington 1993). The endorsement of national identity by minorities is 
often taken to be an indicator of their incorporation into the receiving country society, and to 
represent both acceptance of shared national values and implicit rejection of ethnic or cultural 
distinctiveness (Reeskens and Wright 2013). Conversely, maintenance of strong ethnic 
identities is read as problematic for an integrated society and a challenge to a national 
consensus.  
 
There are, however, two features of this second narrative that merit further interrogation. 
First, ethnic and national identities are not mutually exclusive, since identities are not 
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necessarily binary or oppositional (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007). Moreover, the evidence is 
unclear on whether greater diversity reduces national belonging (Masella 2013). Second, the 
emphasis on the significance of national identification assumes that such an identity is 
endorsed by the population as a whole and represents a consensus of values. This assumption 
is also open to question (Kiely, McCrone and Bechhofer 2005).  
 
This paper explores both of these assumptions using the case of the UK, capitalising on a 
unique, nationally representative data source to analyse identification of both minorities and 
the majority. We utilise and extend Berry’s  acculturation framework (Berry 1997), applying 
the concept of identity acculturation not only to the extent to which minorities maintain single 
or dual identities, but also to diversity in identities among the White majority population. We 
exploit the fact that the UK’s majority population comprises English, Welsh, Scots and 
Northern Irish, and investigate variation in identification with each of these identities and/or 
with an overarching British national identity.  We are thus able to advance understanding of 
ethnic and national identities across the whole population.  
 
We also aim to expand the quantitative evidence base on correlates of variations in national 
identity across ethnic groups and generations, particularly given debates around how 
education and socio-economic status vary with national identification (Kesler and 
Schwartzman 2014).  We argue that when people have other secure sources of identification, 
such as those offered through higher education or occupational status, they may feel less 
invested in national identities (Nandi and Platt 2012). We also evaluate how far age, sex, 
immigrant generation (for minorities), and within-UK country of birth (for the majority) 
influence the extent to which national and ethnic identities are experienced as salient 
(Bechhofer and McCrone 2012; Georgiadis and Manning 2013; Jaspal and Cinnirella 2013; 
Maxwell 2006; Platt 2014).  We additionally test for the contributory role of experience of 
harassment among minorities, since feelings of acceptance have been shown to correlate with 
feelings of belonging (Georgiadis and Manning 2013; Maxwell 2006; Fischer-Neuman 2013; 
Crul and Schneider 2010); and we address the role of political engagement in contributing to 
identity expression (Heath et al. 2013;  Verkuyten and Reijerse 2008).   
 
We find that, after controlling for relevant factors, second generation minorities typically 
have stronger British identities than the White majority, and in a number of cases so also do 
the first generation.  Minorities most commonly have strong dual ethnic and national 
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identities. UK-born minorities are less likely to hold minority only identities than their 
immigrant counterparts and more likely to hold British-only identities, while the shares with 
both weak minority and British and strong dual identities remain relatively constant across 
the generations. There is some variation across ethno-religious groups with the largest share 
of strong dual identities among Indian Sikhs and the smallest among Other White, Caribbean 
Christian groups.  
 
Among the White majority, single English, Scottish, Welsh, Northern Irish identities are the 
most common, with certain exceptions: a sole British identity is dominant among Northern 
Irish Protestants. Political commitment has no substantial independent influence on elective 
identities, unlike socio-demographic factors, possibly suggesting that such attachments 
represent less civic and more ‘ethnic’ nationalism (Smith 1991).  
 
We return to these points in our conclusion, where we consider their implications and reflect 
on the extent to which the specific UK case may also hold lessons for other countries.  
 
Background 
In the context of increasing immigration and the changing composition of European 
populations, there has been extensive debate on the consequences of increasingly 
multicultural societies and the success or otherwise of ‘multiculturalism’ as a political project  
(Koopmans 2013; Kymlicka 1996). Modood (2007) regards multiculturalism as combining 
recognition of groups’ difference with assertion of a common national identity, implying the 
possibility of harmonious dual identities. However, there have been ongoing debates about 
the extent to which group recognition is compatible with the egalitarian principles of liberal 
democracies (Barry 2001). Huntington’s (1993) claim that there are limits to the extent that it 
is possible for different ‘cultures’ to co-exist has found resonance in the political retreat from 
multiculturalism (Koopmans 2013) and anxiety about a fundamental incompatibility between 
difference and shared identity (Verkuyten and Zaremba 2005). For example, in UK political 
discourse, multiculturalism has been linked with separatism, religious fundamentalism, and 
alienation from core national values (Cameron 2011), with failure to accede to British 
national identity seen as a particular issue for the second generation of minorities.  
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In the face of strong academic as well as political conviction that national identity is central 
to social cohesion (Moran 2011; Reeskens and Wright 2014), the quantitative evidence base 
relating to minority or immigrant national identification and its correlates and consequences 
has been growing (e.g. Lam and Smith 2010; Diehl and Schnell 2006; Fischer-Neuman 2013; 
Georgiadis and Manning 2013; Kesler and Schwartzman 2014).  Much of the focus has been 
on the experience of minorities specifically and their in-group or out-group identification. 
Additionally, some studies have also compared minorities with majority, and these suggest 
that immigrant minorities’ national identification is as great as that of the majority, albeit 
with some variation across groups (Georgiadis and Manning 2013; Karlsen and Nazroo 2013; 
Manning and Roy 2010; Masella 2013; Reeskens and Wright 2014). A nascent literature on 
generational change in identity in the UK suggests that across minority groups the tendency is 
for national identity to increase with time and generation, while minority identity declines 
(Georgiadis and Manning 2013; Guveli and Platt 2011; Platt 2014; Karlsen and Nazroo 2013; 
Manning and Roy 2010).  
 
However, despite these suggestive insights, existing research, both qualitative and 
quantitative, often includes only partial coverage of ethnic groups, with much of the current 
literature focusing on Muslim groups and single generations (e.g. Jacobson 1997; Vadher and 
Barrett 2009; Lam and Smith 2010). Moreover, the focus on minority identity integration or 
assimilation has tended to obscure the analysis of national identity among the dominant group 
itself, which has, instead, been the focus of separate study (see e.g. Bechhofer and McCrone 
2012; Kiely, McCrone and Bechhofer 2005). However, majority identification is a critical 
part of the context for minorities: the extent to which minority groups’ identity claims are 
accepted may impact on the degree to which they feel able to make them (Crul and Schneider 
2010). At the same time, shifts in the meaning of national identity resulting from changing 
national composition may be implicated in the extent to which the majority themselves 
identify with an overarching polity (Gong 2007).  
 
It is, therefore, pertinent to contextualise minority diversity within the diversity of the 
majority population identification. Identity acculturation is not a one-sided process (Berry 
1997), and the relations implied within the process of assimilation are not singular (Brubaker 
2001). The potential of national identity effectively to accommodate minority or immigrant 
groups is an important component of the extent to which minorities can and will identify with 
it (Moran 2011). While Scottish identity is being recast as a more ‘inclusive’ identity 
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(Bechhofer and McCrone 2012), the ‘rise’ of English identity (Wyn Jones et al. 2012) may 
herald a redrawing of national boundaries to a more ‘ethnic’ conception of nation (Smith 
1991), with consequences for its inclusivity (Reeskens and Wright 2013).  
 
 
We therefore conceptualize minority and majority identity within an acculturation framework 
which describes the changes that take place in cultural patterns for either group when two 
differentiated groups come into contact (Berry 1997). In this paper we focus on Berry’s 
model of psychological acculturation at the level of individual identity which distinguishes 
between assimilation, integration, separation and marginalisation. 
  
While there is considerable debate around concepts of assimilation and integration (Alba and 
Nee 1997; Brubaker 2001; Rumbaut 1997), whether in relation to structural or cultural 
domains, Berry’s four-way categorisation provides us with a widely accepted nomenclature 
for describing particular intersections on the two axes of ethnic and national identity. Much 
of the discussion around assimilation has been concerned either with distinguishing its 
normative from its descriptive aspects (see e.g. Brubaker 2001) or assessing whether its 
predictions do indeed materialise (e.g. Rumbaut 1997). In this paper we use the term 
assimilation descriptively to define those for whom British national identity predominates. 
Integration has been subject to similar critiques as ‘assimilation’, though, following Berry’s 
terminology, we are operationalising it as representing dual identity. In the same way, 
separation and marginalisation are used as descriptors of predominantly strong ethnic 
identity, and low national and ethnic identification respectively.  
  
While Berry’s framework is well-recognised and has been used in other work on ethnic 
identity and multiculturalism (see e.g. Diehl and Schnell 2006; Heath and Demireva 2013; 
Fischer-Neuman 2014), our approach extends existing research in two ways. First, for 
analysing minority group acculturation, we utilise comparable scaled measures of both 
national and ethnic identity that are collected independently and tap into affective but 
individualised dimensions of identity (Phinney 1992). We are thus able to develop previous 
literature exploring binary measures of national identity that may be associated with legal 
citizenship (Manning and Roy 2010; Platt 2014), and capture a more affective component 
(Reeskens and Wright 2014). We also are able to focus on identity rather than related 
concepts such as belonging (Burton, Nandi and Platt 2010), as used, for example by 
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Georgiadis and Manning (2013) and Maxwell (2006), or connection to a particular country 
(Fisher-Neuman 2014). 
 
In operationalising this framework and investigating patterns of identification, we are 
adopting a concept of identity that is deemed to be stable at the point of analysis, even though 
we recognise that identity is contingent and subject to interpretation and hence is 
differentially adopted and adapted (see e.g. the discussion in Lam and Smith 2010; and 
Verkuyten and Reijerse 2008). As noted by Tajfel (1981), social identity is formed and 
expressed under specific historical, cultural and ideological conditions, and the current 
configuration in the UK marks an interesting case for investigating identities.  
 
The second innovation is that we introduce a comparative analysis of the majority population 
within the same framework as that for minorities. This allows us to engage with the 
heterogeneity of the majority rather than representing it as a monolithic, normative reference 
point. It takes seriously the imperatives of the new assimilation theory (Alba and Nee 1997) 
and of acculturation theory to acknowledge that these processes are two-sided.  
 
From the extant literature, we hypothesise that minorities in the UK will have national 
identities as strong as or stronger than the majority, but that they will vary by group 
(Georgiadis and Manning 2013; Jaspal and Cinnirella 2013; Manning and Roy 2010; 
Maxwell 2006). We expect that British national identity will be stronger in the second 
generation; but will also be  sensitive to the responses of the majority (Heath et al. 2013) and 
hence be reduced by harassment.  We also anticipate that national and ethnic identities will be 
reinforcing, leading to an over-representation of ‘integrated’ (dual) identities. We expect 
separated (ethnic only) identities to decline across generations with a commensurate increase 
in assimilated (British only) identities.   
 
Among the majority, we expect the key influence on the patterning of identity will be 
country-specific national-religious origins. Specifically, we anticipate strongest ‘separated’ 
identification among Scots (Bechhofer and McCrone 2012) and greater attachment to British 
(integrated or assimilated) identities among Northern Irish Protestants. 
 
We nevertheless anticipate that socio-demographics will be associated with different identity 
patterns across both minorities and majority. Among minorities, those with lower socio-
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economic status and lower educational levels and those who are older would be expected to 
have more invested in national (British) identity (Georgiadis and Manning 2013; Maxwell 
2006), as those with more privileged positions have had more opportunities to “select” their 
identities (Kesler and Schwartzman 2014; Nandi and Platt 2012). Among the majority, we 
anticipate that lower socio-economic status and being older will instead be linked to country 
level identities as a more local point of validation.  We anticipate that mainstream political 
engagement is liable to increase investment in assimilated and integrated identities among 
minorities; while, in the face of greater debate over devolution and country identities 
(Bechhofer and McCrone 2012), it will be more closely linked to separated identities among 
the majority.   
 
Data and Measures 
Data 
We use data from Understanding Society, a UK longitudinal survey of a nationally 
representative sample of approximately 28,000 households, with an additional ethnic 
minority boost sample (EMB) of around 4,000 households (Knies 2014). The EMB 
contributed around 1,000 adult interviews of five target ethnic minority groups (Indian, 
Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black African, Caribbean) in addition to those covered in the main 
sample. Every year the adult (16+) household members are asked about their lives. In 
addition to questions on socio-demographic characteristics, the survey includes questions on 
attitudes and identity, including political beliefs, Britishness, strength of identification with 
parents’ ethnic group and national identity. Some of these questions (which we call ‘extra 
questions’) are asked only of a) the EMB, b) a comparison sample of 500 households from 
the main sample, and c) ethnic minorities living in ‘low-density’ areas not covered by the 
EMB. This rich set of identity questions, the representative UK coverage, the large sample 
size and the EMB makes Understanding Society uniquely suited for this analysis.  
 
We use the UK 2011 Census question to identify White majority (as those choosing White: 
British/English/Scottish/Welsh/Northern Irish category) and minority (those choosing any of 
the other categories) groups. 
 
 
Dependent variables: British, ethnic and national identity  
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National identity: The entire sample was asked a standard Census question on national 
identity: respondents selected one or more national identity from English, Welsh, Scottish, 
Northern Irish, British, Irish and Other. Each could be chosen singly or in combination.  
 
British identity: Those eligible for the ‘extra questions’ were asked “how important being 
British” was to them. They were shown an 11-point-scale where higher on the scale was 
“more important” and chose their position on it.  
 
Ethnic identity: Minority group members eligible for ‘extra questions’ were additionally 
asked to give the strength of identification with their father’s ethnic group and with their 
mother’s ethnic group (if different), using a similar format and 11-point scale. We use this as 
our measure of minority ethnic identity, prioritising the highest score where responses on 
mother and father differed. 
 
 
Independent variables  
Ethno-religious group: The ethnic group categories in the 2011 Census questions are widely 
used, but have been criticised for conflating groups with different migration and settlement 
histories and different patterns of association, which are often linked in practice to religious 
distinctions: for example, Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus of Indian origin (see e.g. Longhi et al. 
2013). An alternative is to construct ethno-religious groups, which has the additional 
advantage that it enables the concurrent incorporation of ethnicity and religious affiliation 
into the measure. We use current religion or, if no current religion, the religion respondents 
were brought up in alongside the Census ethnic group categories to construct a 17-category 
measure of ethno-religious group.
i
  
 
Country-community origin: For majority group analysis, we constructed a measure of 
country-community origins that combined country of birth (whether England, Scotland, 
Wales, Northern Ireland or elsewhere
ii
) with religious affiliation / community of upbringing 
(Catholic, Protestant, or other or none).  From this we derived a nine-category measure that 
distinguished religion / religious community for Scotland and Northern Ireland, where it is 
most likely to be salient for national identity, but not for England, Wales or Other.  
 
Other covariates 
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Demographic variables: We include age measured in six bands, and sex, along with marital/ 
cohabitation status, measured as single never married, cohabiting, married or in a civil 
partnership, separated widowed or divorced. We also include region of residence. 
 
UK-born: We include a measure of immigrant generation, identified by whether UK-born 
(second or subsequent generation) or not (first generation) in the minority group analysis.   
 
Socio-economic position: To investigate whether identity varied with socio-economic 
position, we included measures of highest qualification (four categories), employment status, 
and occupational class as measured by the eight-category National Statistics Socio-economic 
Classification (Rose, Pevalin and O'Reilly 2005).  
 
Political engagement: We utilise a measure of political party affiliation, both strong and 
weak, to capture political engagement in the minority group analysis. Given that the vast 
majority affiliate to one of the UK-wide national parties (cf. Heath et al. 2013), this takes the 
form of a 7-category variable of none/not-eligible to vote, and strong and weak Conservative, 
Labour and Other party supporter. In the majority analysis, given that different political 
parties operate in the different countries of the UK, we use a three-category general measure 
of political support i.e. whether supported any party strongly or weakly or not at all.  
 
Harassment: In the minority group analyses, we include a three-category measure of no 
harassment, direct experience of physical or verbal harassment and feeling unsafe. 
 
 
Analytical approach 
We first examine our hypotheses that strength of British identity is as great or greater among 
minorities as among the majority, but with some diversity across groups. As this question was 
one of the “extra questions”, we are left with a sample (Sample 1) of N=7,762 of whom 14 
per cent are White majority. We regress British identity on ethno-religious group and the full 
set of covariates using Ordinary Least Squares regression. Using Sample 1, our reference 
population for ethno-religious group is White Christian majority.  
 
For the analysis of both minority and majority acculturation we adopt – and adapt –Berry’s 
four-way acculturation framework. Berry and Sam (1997) identified four potential pathways 
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that behavioural and identity acculturation could take: assimilation, integration, separation 
and marginalisation. As noted, we use these labels as analytical descriptors of particular 
positions on the two axes of national and ethnic identity rather than as normative categories 
(cf. Brubaker 2001). The framework with these labels is illustrated schematically in the top 
panel of Figure 1.  
 
(FIGURE 1) 
 
For the analysis of minority acculturation, we allocate minority group individuals to the four 
levels of the quadrant based on the measures of ethnic and British identity. We distinguish 
strong and weak identification by whether responses fall above or below the median value. 
These questions were part of the “extra questions” and we are thus left with a minority-only 
sample (Sample 2) of N=6,490. This allocation and the ensuing distribution are illustrated in 
the second panel of Figure 1.
iii
 While the use of the median is essentially arbitrary (Berry and 
Sabatier 2010), the fact that it splits the population equally means that if there were no 
association between the strength of the two identities, we would expect to find 25 per cent of 
the sample in each cell. If there was a negative relationship between the two identities, there 
would be over-representation in the assimilated and separated cells. In fact, it is the integrated 
cell that shows over-representation, indicating that those who identify strongly on one 
measure are more likely to identify strongly on the other.  
 
We model these four outcomes by estimating a multinomial logistic regression model on our 
second sample, with ‘separated’ as the reference category, and including the full set of 
covariates.  
 
To model the White majority’s identity acculturation, we utilise responses to the multicode 
measure of national identity, described above.  We are thus left with a sample (Sample 3) of 
N=35,617 White majority respondents. Respondents are allocated to the integrated category 
if they claim both a British and (English/Welsh/Scottish/ Northern Irish) country-level 
identity, as separated if they claim a country identity only, assimilated if they claim a British 
identity only and marginalised if they do not claim any UK country or British identity. This 
last group is a small residual group, as the third panel of Figure 1 shows, and includes those 
who describe their national identity as Irish as well as some who identify with another 
country, despite claiming White – British/ English/ Scottish/ Welsh/ Northern Irish as their 
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ethnic group. Since the allocation is based on a different measure and cannot be constructed 
to be evenly split across the two axes, it is not directly comparable with the measure of 
acculturation used in the minority group analysis. Nevertheless, it indicates the priority 
accorded by the majority to different identity options, which provides important context for 
the minority choices. It also allows investigation of whether predictors of different 
acculturation outcomes are consistent or differ across minorities and majority.  
 
We again estimate multinomial logit models for the relative chance of being in the integrated, 
assimilated or marginalized categories relative to being in the separated group, exploring 
differences between country-community origins compared to the reference category of 
English origins. 
 
To facilitate interpretation of the multinomial logistic regressions, we provide tables of 
predicted probabilities of the four outcomes to illustrate the average marginal effects of 
certain key predictors of interest, including ethno-religious group and country-community 
origin. 
 
All estimations are weighted using household design weights, and standard errors estimated 
correctly by accounting for the complex survey design.  Descriptive statistics of all variables 
used in the analysis for each of the three samples are provided in the supplemental material, 
as Appendix: Table A1.  
 
Minority ethnic identity and acculturation 
We first address the question of how British identity varies across ethno-religious groups. 
Table 1 shows the results from the full OLS model. 
 
(TABLE 1) 
 
After adjusting for covariates, Caribbean Christians, those of mixed ethnicity and the various 
‘other’ groups, were not significantly different from the White Christian majority in their 
strength of British identification. Only the Other White group had a significantly less strong 
British identity while all other ethno-religious groups expressed a stronger British identity. A 
difference of more than one point on the 11-point scale was found for Indian, Pakistani, 
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Bangladeshi and Black African Muslims and Indian Sikhs and less than one point for Indian 
Hindus and Black African Christians. These differences are consistent with our hypotheses 
derived from related literature using different data and measures. Notably, however, here we 
use a direct measure of national identity that better reflects its conceptualisation in the 
literature, and a more fine-grained and comprehensive ethnic group categorisation that 
reveals consistency but also differences within the Indian population as well as the high 
British identification of Black African Christians. Some of the difference in British 
identification between ethno-religious groups is explained by differences in their political 
affiliation and support. Once the political support variable was included, ethno-religious 
group coefficients were attenuated. Political support, whether strong or weak, for either of the 
two main political parties (Labour and Conservative) was positively associated with British 
identification, though this was not the case for support for an alternative party.  This suggests 
that engagement with national politics reinforces feelings of being part of the nation, but only 
when that engagement is mainstream.  
 
Being UK-born was positively associated with British identification, as expected. In addition, 
higher qualifications,
iv
 being from a professional occupation, being younger and being a 
student were negatively associated with Britishness, while a semi-routine or routine 
occupation or being long-term unemployed were positively associated,  illustrating the 
greater salience of national identity in the absence of competing professional identities, in 
line with our hypotheses. Congruent with expectations, experience of harassment was 
negatively associated with British identity.  
 
This analysis is not, however, informative about the relationship between British and ethnic 
identity.  For that, we turn to our multinomial logit model of identity acculturation among the 
minority groups.  
 
Table 2 illustrates predicted probabilities of the four acculturation outcomes deriving from 
the average marginal effects of the multinomial logit of certain key characteristics of 
interest.
v
 (Full model estimates available on request.)  
 
(TABLE 2) 
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Table 2 shows that across ethnic groups and generations, integrated (dual identity) is the most 
common outcome in almost all cases. The full table (not illustrated) showed that integrated 
outcomes also tend to be associated with those factors which we hypothesised would be 
particularly associated with positive national identification, such as lower qualifications 
levels and a poorer employment situation, and which were found to be associated with British 
identity in the initial analysis. Despite the substantial focus in the literature on Muslim 
identities (see e.g. Guveli and Platt 2011; Kalsen and Nazroo 2013; Koopmans 2013; 
Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007), there is no evidence that Pakistani Muslims are more likely to 
have a separated identity or less likely to have an integrated identity than other groups. 
 
The exception to predominance of integrated identities is among those of Other White 
backgrounds, for which ‘marginalised’ (weak ethnic and British identity) is the most frequent 
outcome. Other White is a composite group, which contains multiple ‘white’ origins. 
Nevertheless, these findings speak to the greater independence from commitment to ethnic or 
national identity offered by the greater flexibility and transnational opportunities offered by 
most Other White backgrounds, whether of EU, North American or Antipodean origins. 
 
Caribbeans, though coming from a very different migration context, have a similar pattern of 
relatively low integrated acculturation outcomes to the Other White group  (though for them 
it is still the most likely outcome) and relatively high rates of marginalised identities across 
generations, higher than would come from random allocation. This is consistent with the 
findings on relative alienation found by Heath and Demireva (2014), and is a potential 
concerns if strong identity in at least in one of the domains is important for psychological 
well-being.  
 
Having a solely strong British identity (“assimilated”) is less common, as expected, among 
first generation minorities, but increases in the second generation to around one in five for 
most groups. Correspondingly, separated (strong ethnic only) identities are more common in 
the first generation and decline among the UK born, though they still constitute between one 
in eight and one in five of most groups. These individual are those, who, controlling for 
background characteristics, might be considered to have failed to take on and accord with the 
‘national story’ of their country of birth and residence. However, the overall distributions are 
partly an artefact of the distinction between “high” and “low” at the median: and the rates are 
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still lower than would be expected from random allocation (which would give 25 per cent in 
each category).  
 
For those second generation who are ‘separated’, there is no particularly ethno-religious 
group pattern, with Caribbean and African Christians, Indian Hindus and Chinese with no 
religion the most likely to be in this position. While the rates of marginalisation show 
variation across groups there is relative stability over generations. Against expectations, 
marginalisation does not, therefore, appear to be a particular issue of the second generation 
but is more group- than generation-specific. 
 
Table 2 also illustrates the extent to which identity acculturation varies with political 
engagement. Both strong Labour and Conservative support are associated with higher rates of 
integrated identities, other things being equal. Having no political beliefs or engagement is, 
conversely, associated with higher rates of separated identities. This enhances the findings 
from the British identity analysis, since it shows how it is primarily strong dual identities, 
rather than simply strong British identities that are associated with political commitment and 
engagement.  
 
We now turn to the patterns among the White majority. 
 
Majority population and identity acculturation  
Table 3 shows predicted probabilities for particular characteristics from the full multinomial 
logit model of White majority identity acculturation. (Full model estimates available on 
request.) 
 
(TABLE 3) 
 
Table 3 shows that, controlling for covariates, almost all country-community groups select a 
separated (country only) identity as their modal choice. That is, given the option to select a 
single British or country identity or a multiple identity, most selected a single country. The 
exception, in line with expectations, is Northern Irish Protestants for whom the modal 
category is, rather, assimilated (British only). This was also the preferred option for those 
who had a non-UK country of birth, who had a fairly bimodal distribution, being very 
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unlikely to select two UK identities.  Contrary to expectations deriving from the closely-
fought referendum on independence, the Scots were no more likely than the Welsh to have 
separated identities, and slightly less likely than Northern Irish Catholics.  
 
While English-born are just as likely to have integrated (British and English) as assimilated 
identities, Scots (both Protestant and Catholic) and Welsh have lower rates of assimilated 
identities. However, interestingly, Northern Irish Catholics are more likely to have 
assimilated than integrated identities. They are also the only group with a non-negligible 
share (5 per cent) in the marginalized (neither identity) category. This tends to be because 
these respondents select Irish, so it should not be interpreted as lacking an ethnic/country 
identity, but rather as not holding any UK identity. Nevertheless the proportion maintaining 
this ‘alternative’ identity is still small, perhaps surprisingly given historical ties to the 
republic.  
 
Turning to other covariates (not illustrated), higher educational qualifications were associated 
with a greater chance of selecting a British identity (whether integrated or assimilated) 
relative to holding a country-only identity (separated). Thus, as hypothesised, country 
identities would seem to offer more to the majority population in the absence of external 
validation offered by higher socio-economic status, whereas for minorities, it was British 
identity that seemed to invite greater investment among the less privileged. 
 
Political engagement (illustrated in Table 3) was less strongly associated with majority 
identity choices, despite the intensity of political debate around devolution (and 
independence). In fact, while (any) party support was significantly associated with a lower 
likelihood of an integrated relative to a separated identity, compared to those without any 
party affiliation the differences were small. No other political affiliation differences were 
statistically significant. Thus, political engagement and identity do not seem as closely 
interconnected as they were for minorities, though the inability to distinguish parties in this 
multi-country framework may have somewhat disguised the relationship with specific party 
support.    
 
Summary and conclusions  
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Minorities’ identification with the majority society in which they live is widely regarded as 
an important indicator of cohesion and of successfully integrated societies. There have been 
claims that multiculturalist policies have inhibited such identification and thus created 
alienation and exacerbated cultural conflict. However, these claims involve assumptions both 
about the incompatibility of ethnic and national identities, and about the coherence of 
national identity claims. Minorities have been the explicit targets of concerns about lack of 
national identification and the failure of multiculturalist policies to create a coherent sense of 
national belonging (Huntington 1993; Heath and Demireva 2014;Koopmans 2013; Verkuyten 
and Zaremba 2005), yet it is not clear that majorities themselves sign up to national identity 
in systematic or consistent ways.  
 
We therefore set out to investigate these two issues by analysing British national identity 
across the UK’s minority and majority groups, taking into account other relevant influences. 
Competing identities for the majority in a context such as the UK are offered by country level 
identities, which can be considered more ethnic than civic national identities. By using a 
similar framework for analysing majority dual and single identification as for minorities, we 
shed greater light on the extent to which national identity is or is not central to majority 
society. 
 
We hypothesised that minority groups’ British identity would be as strong as or stronger than 
the majority population; and we found this was the case.  In particular, minorities were likely 
to hold strong dual (ethnic minority and British national) identities. We also expected 
differences across ethnic groups, and we found substantial differences in identity, but without 
any systematic pattern, other than the greater tendency of Other White and Caribbean groups 
to lack strong ethnic or national identification.   
 
Amid increasing interest in the ‘second generation’ (Crul and Vermeulen 2003; Heath, 
Rothon and Kilpi 2008), we demonstrated that while generational change in the patterning of 
identities was more of a continuum than a step change, it was clearly in the direction of 
maintaining majority identities more and minority ones less, while dual identities were 
relatively stable. 
 
There is substantial heterogeneity in identity formation and strength across ethnic minority 
groups and within the UK majority. Minorities are, nevertheless, largely signed up to the 
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“national story” represented by British identity. However, as around half of the majority 
population endorse solely country-specific identities when given the choice, this national 
story may in fact be less unitary and more fractured. We further revealed how lower socio-
economic status influences identity patterning across both majority and minorities, but is 
linked more to British identity among minorities and more to ‘ethnic’ country-level identities 
among the majority. The implication is that over time, as educational levels increase, we 
might expect some convergence in levels of British identification. But questions over the 
overarching coherence of the category will remain.  
 
For the majority, political investment is positively associated with country-specific rather 
than British identities and thus the mutual reinforcement is in the direction of ethnic rather 
than civic conceptions of nation, while the civic nation increasingly captures the endorsement 
of minority groups. Rather than stressing national identity as a marker of cohesion, a more 
productive path in the medium term towards enhancing common points of identification may 
be to focus on the civic inclusiveness of sub-national categories (cf. Crul and Schneider 
2010).  
 
While our analysis was specific to the UK context, our results may be relevant to Europe-
wide analysis of identity. First, we have contributed to the evidence base around the 
relationship between education / socio-economic position and national and ethnic identity, 
which has been subject to debate and different findings across studies. Second, we show how 
there is a clear shift across immigrant generations in patterns of identity acculturation, even 
given differences between groups. Third, we show how this strengthening of national identity 
over generations is occurring in the context of an apparent retreat among the majority 
population from an overarching national identification. While this may in some part be due to 
the specific context of devolution in the UK, it indicates the broader need to reconsider 
national identification as a straightforward marker of cohesion (Reeskins and Wright 2013a), 
and instead to debate how it is ‘owned’ across populations.  
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Notes 
 
i
 More detailed information on the construction of this variable is available on request.  
ii
 Given the focus on those who identified as White majority, the number born outside the UK was relatively 
small, around 2 per cent of this sample. 
iii
 We tried an alternative definition of strong and weak identification: using scores of 6 and above on the 11- 
point scale to represent strong identification. More than 50 per cent of individuals choose scores that are greater 
than the mid-point of the scale and, as a result, when we used this alternative definition, the number of people 
categorised as having a strong identification with their parents’ ethnic group increased by 11 percentage points 
and those having a strong identification with British identity increased by 17 percentage points. The resulting 
distribution of acculturation identities according to Berry’s framework is shown in the supplemental material, 
Appendix: Figure A1. While using this alternative definition may be beneficial for future international 
comparisons based on identity ratings, it does not have the nice interpretation of the median cut-off for this 
paper, which illustrates how far from a random distribution of responses, respondents’ identity choices are.  
iv
 We also interact this with an ethnic minority dummy variable and find that both this result holds for both the 
White majority and ethnic minorities; but the difference across educational groups (tertiary vs others) is higher 
among the White majority than ethnic minorities (see Appendix: Table A2). 
v
 Results based on the model using the alternative definition of strength of identification showed that the pattern 
remained almost the same, even though the exact proportions differed: see Appendix Table A3. An exception 
was that the probability of choosing a marginalized identity vis-a-vis a separated identity did not differ across 
different political affiliations. 
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Figure 1: Measurement of identity acculturation outcomes 
Berry’s Framework 
  Cultural Maintenance Is it considered to be of 
value to maintain one’s identity and 
characteristics?  
Yes No  
Contact Participation 
Is it considered to be of value to 
maintain relationships with larger 
society?  
Yes  Integration  Assimilation 
No  Separation  Marginalization  
Measurement of identity acculturation among the UK’s minority ethnic groups 
 Cultural Maintenance 
Maximum of strength of identification with 
father’s and mother’s ethnic groups 
> Median <=Median  
Contact Participation 
Strength of identification with 
being British  
> Median  Integrated (43.7%, 
N=2,859) 
Assimilated (12.9%, 
N=842) 
<=Median  Separated (22.1%, 
N=1,450) 
Marginalized (21.4%, 
N=1,399) 
Measurement of identity acculturation in the White majority population 
 Cultural Maintenance 
Is it considered to be of value to maintain 
one’s identity and characteristics? 
National identity=individual UK country 
(i.e. Scotland or Wales or England or 
Northern Ireland)  
Yes  No  
Contact Participation 
Is it considered to be of value to 
maintain relationships with larger 
society? 
National identity=British?  
Yes  Integration (24.7%, 
N=5,949) 
Assimilation  
(23.7%%, N=5,718) 
No  Separation  (50.8%, 
N=12,258) 
Marginalization 
(0.8%, N=186) 
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Table 1: OLS estimates of a model of strength of British identity 
 With political 
affiliation 
Without political 
affiliation 
 Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Age group (Omitted: 40-49 years) 
  
  
16-19 years -0.44*** 0.25 -0.57*** 0.25 
20-29 years -0.66*** 0.16 -0.76*** 0.17 
30-39 years -0.25*** 0.14 -0.30*** 0.14 
50-59 years 0.54*** 0.16 0.60*** 0.16 
60+ years 0.53*** 0.18 0.73*** 0.18 
Female 0.01*** 0.09 -0.03*** 0.10 
Region of residence (Omitted: London) 
 
   
North -0.13*** 0.14 -0.15*** 0.14 
Midlands -0.19*** 0.14 -0.22*** 0.14 
East, South -0.49*** 0.14 -0.49*** 0.14 
Wales -0.29*** 0.36 -0.29*** 0.37 
Scotland -1.68*** 0.30 -1.74*** 0.31 
Area of low ethnic minority density -0.08*** 0.13 -0.13*** 0.14 
Current marital status (Omitted: Never married) 
  
  
Cohabiting as a couple 0.12*** 0.22 0.16*** 0.22 
Married or in a Civil Partnership 0.18*** 0.14 0.22*** 0.14 
Separated, Divorced or Widowed 0.00*** 0.18 0.03*** 0.19 
Highest educational qualification (Omitted: University degree or 
higher) 
  
  
No educational qualifications 0.56*** 0.16 0.48*** 0.17 
O’ levels or equivalent 0.44*** 0.14 0.41*** 0.14 
A’ levels or equivalent, diploma 0.38*** 0.13 0.39*** 0.14 
Current employment or main activity status (Omitted: Employed) 
  
  
Not Employed 0.10*** 0.14 0.09*** 0.14 
Taking care of family -0.29*** 0.18 -0.27*** 0.18 
Full-time student -0.38*** 0.20 -0.34*** 0.21 
NS-SEC (Omitted: Routine) 
  
  
Large employers & higher management -0.19*** 0.28 -0.09*** 0.29 
Higher professional -0.48*** 0.24 -0.44*** 0.24 
Lower management & professional 0.01*** 0.19 0.05*** 0.19 
Intermediate -0.16*** 0.20 -0.09*** 0.20 
Small employers & own account -0.15*** 0.24 -0.14*** 0.25 
Lower supervisory & technical -0.17*** 0.24 -0.17*** 0.24 
Semi-routine 0.28*** 0.17 0.27*** 0.17 
Never worked & long-term unemployed 0.38*** 0.18 0.32*** 0.18 
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Table 1: OLS estimates of a model of strength of British identity (continued) 
 With political 
affiliation 
Without political 
affiliation 
 Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Political beliefs (Omitted: None, don’t know or can’t vote)     
Conservative party, strong supporter 1.42*** 0.21   
Conservative party, not very strong supporter 0.99*** 0.16   
Labour party, strong supporter 1.03*** 0.13   
Labour party, not very strong supporter 0.58*** 0.12   
Other party, strong supporter 0.13*** 0.27   
Other party, not very strong supporter 0.26*** 0.17   
Harassment experience last year (Omitted: None) 
  
  
Was physically attacked or verbally insulted  -0.28*** 0.12 -0.24*** 0.12 
Avoided or felt unsafe -0.02*** 0.11 0.00*** 0.11 
Born in UK 0.74*** 0.13 0.80*** 0.14 
Ethno-religious groups (Omitted: White Christian majority) 
  
  
Caribbean Christian 0.09*** 0.20 0.03*** 0.20 
African Christian 0.51*** 0.24 0.60*** 0.25 
Other Ethnic group Christian -0.37*** 0.29 -0.4*** 0.30 
Indian Muslim 1.33*** 0.30 1.36*** 0.30 
Pakistani Muslim 1.14*** 0.20 1.15*** 0.20 
Bangladeshi Muslim 1.10*** 0.21 1.14*** 0.22 
African Muslim 1.14*** 0.29 1.15*** 0.29 
Arab-Turkey Muslim 0.69*** 0.52 0.54*** 0.55 
Indian Hindu 0.72*** 0.22 0.70*** 0.23 
Indian Sikh 1.15*** 0.24 1.23*** 0.25 
White majority, No religion -0.17*** 0.24 -0.3*** 0.25 
Chinese No religion -0.11*** 0.42 -0.32*** 0.43 
Other ethnic group No religion -0.18*** 0.38 -0.34*** 0.38 
Other ethnic -religious combinations 0.25*** 0.20 0.14*** 0.21 
Mixed -0.07*** 0.22 -0.13*** 0.22 
Other white -1.50*** 0.40 -1.61*** 0.41 
Constant 5.86*** 0.30 6.35*** 0.30 
Number of observations 7,762 7,762 
Notes: weighted using household design weights, standard errors estimated correctly by accounting for the complex survey design 
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Table 2: Estimates of acculturation outcomes from fully adjusted multinomial model, by ethno-religious group 
and (migrant) generation and political affiliation and sex (n=6,490) 
 Separated Integrated Assimilated Marginalized 
First generation     
Pakistani Muslim (ref) 0.19 0.51 0.10 0.20 
Caribbean Christian 0.27 0.34 0.09 0.30 
African Christian 0.29 0.43 0.10 0.17 
Other Ethnic group Christian 0.29 0.36 0.08 0.27 
Indian Muslim 0.17 0.48 0.18 0.16 
Bangladeshi Muslim 0.22 0.49 0.10 0.18 
African Muslim 0.24 0.49 0.09 0.18 
Arab-Turkey Muslim 0.24 0.48 0.06 0.22 
Indian Hindu 0.28 0.48 0.08 0.16 
Indian Sikh 0.23 0.55 0.10 0.12 
Chinese No religion 0.32 0.41 0.04 0.23 
Other ethnic group No religion 0.22 0.28 0.10 0.41 
Other ethnic -religious combinations 0.29 0.37 0.12 0.22 
Mixed parentage 0.19 0.34 0.11 0.37 
Other White 0.32 0.26 0.04 0.38 
UK born minorities     
Pakistani Muslim (ref) 0.13 0.49 0.19 0.19 
Caribbean Christian 0.19 0.34 0.17 0.29 
African Christian 0.21 0.42 0.20 0.17 
Other Ethnic group Christian 0.21 0.36 0.17 0.26 
Indian Muslim 0.11 0.43 0.32 0.14 
Bangladeshi Muslim 0.16 0.47 0.20 0.18 
African Muslim 0.17 0.48 0.17 0.18 
Arab-Turkey Muslim 0.18 0.48 0.12 0.22 
Indian Hindu 0.20 0.48 0.16 0.15 
Indian Sikh 0.16 0.54 0.18 0.12 
Chinese No religion 0.24 0.44 0.08 0.24 
Other ethnic group No religion 0.15 0.27 0.18 0.39 
Other ethnic -religious combinations 0.20 0.36 0.23 0.21 
Mixed parentage 0.13 0.32 0.20 0.35 
Other white 0.24 0.27 0.09 0.40 
Men     
No beliefs, don’t know, cannot vote (ref) 0.25 0.36 0.12 0.27 
Conservative, strong support 0.15 0.49 0.14 0.21 
Conservative, not very strong support 0.16 0.37 0.19 0.28 
Labour, strong support 0.20 0.47 0.16 0.17 
Labour, not very strong support 0.23 0.42 0.13 0.23 
Other party, strong support 0.12 0.42 0.11 0.34 
Other, not very strong support 0.17 0.34 0.17 0.32 
Women     
No beliefs, don’t know, cannot vote (ref) 0.29 0.39 0.09 0.24 
Conservative, strong support 0.17 0.53 0.11 0.19 
Conservative, not very strong support 0.19 0.41 0.15 0.25 
Labour, strong support 0.23 0.51 0.12 0.14 
Labour, not very strong support 0.26 0.45 0.10 0.20 
Other party, strong support 0.14 0.46 0.09 0.31 
Other, not very strong support 0.20 0.38 0.13 0.29 
Notes: Estimates at mean values of other covariates, deriving from full model, weighted using household design weights, standard 
errors estimated correctly by accounting for the complex survey design. Indicated in bold are statistically significant (at 5% level) 
differences from (italicised) reference categories of English, and No political affiliation, respectively.   
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Table 3: Acculturation Patterns among the White majority by country/community of origin and political 
support and sex (n=35,617)  
 Separated  Integrated  Assimilated  Marginalised  
English (ref) 0.52 0.24 0.23 0.004 
Scottish Protestant  0.60 0.27 0.13 0.003 
Scottish Catholic  0.65 0.25 0.10 0.002 
Welsh  0.63 0.24 0.13 0.000 
Northern Irish Protestant  0.30 0.22 0.48 0.004 
Northern Irish Catholic  0.72 0.05 0.17 0.053 
Other country of birth  0.39 0.13 0.45 0.032 
Men     
No political affiliation, cannot vote (ref) 0.59 0.21 0.20 0.004 
Not strong political party support 0.56 0.24 0.20 0.004 
Strong political party support 0.57 0.22 0.21 0.004 
Women     
No political affiliation, cannot vote (ref) 0.53 0.23 0.24 0.003 
Not strong political party support 0.50 0.26 0.23 0.003 
Strong political party support 0.51 0.24 0.25 0.003 
Notes: Estimates at mean values of other covariates, deriving from full model, weighted using household design weights, standard 
errors estimated correctly by accounting for the complex survey design. Indicated in bold are statistically significant (at 5% level) 
differences from (italicised) reference categories of English, and No political affiliation, respectively.   
 
 
